SQL injection in Strapi

Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In versions on the 4.x branch prior to 4.26.1 and on the 5.x branch prior to 5.33.2, a database-query injection vulnerability existed in the Strapi Content-Type Builder write API. An authenticated administrator could inject arbitrary database statements through the `column.defaultTo` attribute when creating or modifying a content type. Setting `defaultTo` as a tuple `[value, { isRaw: true }]` caused the value to be passed directly into Knex's `db.connection.raw()` during schema migration without sanitization, allowing arbitrary statement execution at the database layer. Depending on the database engine, this enabled arbitrary file read via database utility functions, denial of service via forced server crash on schema-migration error, and on engines that permit external program execution, remote code execution against the database server. The patch in versions 4.26.1 and 5.33.2 addresses this by restricting all Content-Type Builder write APIs to development mode only. Production deployments running v5.33.2 or later return 404 for requests against `/content-type-builder/content-types` and related endpoints, removing the network-reachable attack surface entirely.