net/sched: flower: Fix chain template offload
CVSS Skor
7.1
EPSS İhtimal
%0.2
Risk Skoru
0.0
Yayın
2 yıl önce
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CVE-2024-26669 için toplanan üretici, dağıtım, yama ve güvenlik kaynağı kayıtlarını karşılaştırıp kanıt bağlantılı bir açıklama hazırlayalım.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: flower: Fix chain template offload When a qdisc is deleted from a net device the stack instructs the underlying driver to remove its flow offload callback from the associated filter block using the 'FLOW_BLOCK_UNBIND' command. The stack then continues to replay the removal of the filters in the block for this driver by iterating over the chains in the block and invoking the 'reoffload' operation of the classifier being used. In turn, the classifier in its 'reoffload' operation prepares and emits a 'FLOW_CLS_DESTROY' command for each filter. However, the stack does not do the same for chain templates and the underlying driver never receives a 'FLOW_CLS_TMPLT_DESTROY' command when a qdisc is deleted. This results in a memory leak [1] which can be reproduced using [2]. Fix by introducing a 'tmplt_reoffload' operation and have the stack invoke it with the appropriate arguments as part of the replay. Implement the operation in the sole classifier that supports chain templates (flower) by emitting the 'FLOW_CLS_TMPLT_{CREATE,DESTROY}' command based on whether a flow offload callback is being bound to a filter block or being unbound from one. As far as I can tell, the issue happens since cited commit which reordered tcf_block_offload_unbind() before tcf_block_flush_all_chains() in __tcf_block_put(). The order cannot be reversed as the filter block is expected to be freed after flushing all the chains. [1] unreferenced object 0xffff888107e28800 (size 2048): comm "tc", pid 1079, jiffies 4294958525 (age 3074.287s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): b1 a6 7c 11 81 88 ff ff e0 5b b3 10 81 88 ff ff ..|......[...... 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 aa b0 84 ff ff ff ff ................ backtrace: [<ffffffff81c06a68>] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1e8/0x320 [<ffffffff81ab374e>] __kmalloc+0x4e/0x90 [<ffffffff832aec6d>] mlxsw_sp_acl_ruleset_get+0x34d/0x7a0 [<ffffffff832bc195>] mlxsw_sp_flower_tmplt_create+0x145/0x180 [<ffffffff832b2e1a>] mlxsw_sp_flow_block_cb+0x1ea/0x280 [<ffffffff83a10613>] tc_setup_cb_call+0x183/0x340 [<ffffffff83a9f85a>] fl_tmplt_create+0x3da/0x4c0 [<ffffffff83a22435>] tc_ctl_chain+0xa15/0x1170 [<ffffffff838a863c>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3cc/0xed0 [<ffffffff83ac87f0>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x170/0x440 [<ffffffff83ac6270>] netlink_unicast+0x540/0x820 [<ffffffff83ac6e28>] netlink_sendmsg+0x8d8/0xda0 [<ffffffff83793def>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x30f/0xa80 [<ffffffff8379d29a>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x13a/0x1e0 [<ffffffff8379d50c>] __sys_sendmsg+0x11c/0x1f0 [<ffffffff843b9ce0>] do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0 unreferenced object 0xffff88816d2c0400 (size 1024): comm "tc", pid 1079, jiffies 4294958525 (age 3074.287s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 57 f6 38 be 00 00 00 00 @.......W.8..... 10 04 2c 6d 81 88 ff ff 10 04 2c 6d 81 88 ff ff ..,m......,m.... backtrace: [<ffffffff81c06a68>] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1e8/0x320 [<ffffffff81ab36c1>] __kmalloc_node+0x51/0x90 [<ffffffff81a8ed96>] kvmalloc_node+0xa6/0x1f0 [<ffffffff82827d03>] bucket_table_alloc.isra.0+0x83/0x460 [<ffffffff82828d2b>] rhashtable_init+0x43b/0x7c0 [<ffffffff832aed48>] mlxsw_sp_acl_ruleset_get+0x428/0x7a0 [<ffffffff832bc195>] mlxsw_sp_flower_tmplt_create+0x145/0x180 [<ffffffff832b2e1a>] mlxsw_sp_flow_block_cb+0x1ea/0x280 [<ffffffff83a10613>] tc_setup_cb_call+0x183/0x340 [<ffffffff83a9f85a>] fl_tmplt_create+0x3da/0x4c0 [<ffffffff83a22435>] tc_ctl_chain+0xa15/0x1170 [<ffffffff838a863c>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3cc/0xed0 [<ffffffff83ac87f0>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x170/0x440 [<ffffffff83ac6270>] netlink_unicast+0x540/0x820 [<ffffffff83ac6e28>] netlink_sendmsg+0x8d8/0xda0 [<ffffffff83793def>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x30f/0xa80 [2] # tc qdisc add dev swp1 clsact # tc chain add dev swp1 ingress proto ip chain 1 flower dst_ip 0.0.0.0/32 # tc qdisc del dev ---truncated---
IMPACT — Etkilenen Ürünler ve Yazılımlar
Affected Products
The following products are affected by CVE-2024-26669 vulnerability. Even if our threat engine is aware of the exact versions of the products that are affected, the information is represented below.
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The Common Vulnerability Scoring System is a standardized framework for assessing the severity of vulnerabilities in software and systems. We collect and display CVSS scores from various sources for each CVE.
| SCORE | VERSION | SEVERITY | VECTOR | SOURCE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7.1 | CVSS V31 | HIGH | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H | NVD |
Yama ve İyileştirme Rehberi (Solution)
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Zafiyet Dağılımı ve Saldırı Kalıpları (CWE & CAPEC)
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While CVE identifies specific instances of vulnerabilities, CWE categorizes the common flaws or weaknesses that can lead to vulnerabilities. CVE-2024-26669 is associated with the following CWEs:
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the common attributes and approaches employed by adversaries to exploit the CVE-2024-26669 weaknesses.
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