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CVE-2026-99170

namespace: a mount that copy_tree() leaves out can't take over a lock

CVSS score

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EPSS probability

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Risk score

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Published

3 h ago

Patch status has not yet been verified

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Vulnerability description

DayBreach CVE AI Research

CVE-2026-99170 has vendor, distribution, patch and security-source records on file. We can compare them and prepare an explanation linked to the evidence.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namespace: a mount that copy_tree() leaves out can't take over a lock Since commit c62a4766937e ("move_mount: transfer MNT_LOCKED") a mount can be moved beneath a locked mount. The lock moves from the old cover to the new mount which takes over the job of hiding what's under it and the old cover can be unmounted. That works as long as the new mount stays. But the caller picks the new mount and copy_tree() leaves a mount of a mount namespace file out of every copy made without CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE, together with everything mounted on it, and never looks at MNT_LOCKED. unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) and mount propagation make such copies. So a task that is root in its own user namespace gets rid of a locked cover on a file without a race and without touching the filesystem below it. It makes a child with a mount namespace of its own, binds the child's /proc/<pid>/ns/mnt beneath the cover with MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH, which hands the lock to that bind, and calls unshare(CLONE_NEWNS). The new mount namespace has nothing on the file. That's the usual way to mask a single file, a bind of /dev/null or of an empty file. With a bind of an ordinary file the file stays covered. copy_tree() already refuses to leave out a locked unbindable mount with -EPERM since commit df7342b24018 ("mount: Don't allow copying MNT_UNBINDABLE|MNT_LOCKED mounts"). Do the same for a locked mount of a mount namespace file. That also covers a tree copied with CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE and attached into a mount namespace of another user namespace where lock_mnt_tree() locks it. Note that unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) and clone(CLONE_NEWNS) fail with EPERM from such a mount namespace from then on. The mount can't be left out and it can't be unmounted. And refuse to move a mount of a mount namespace file beneath a locked mount in the first place. Otherwise the task ends up with a mount it can't unmount and an unshare() that fails for good. Chris also found a second mount that goes away by itself, a clone of an automounted mount that shrink_submounts() took along with its parent. Commit f78ddcc87224 ("namespace: never expire a locked mount") took care of that one. Chris's reproducer is appended. Mode nsfile reads SECRET after the unshare() on 7.3-rc7, with this patch the move_mount() fails with EINVAL and the file stays covered. nsfile-control uses an ordinary file and reads MASK both ways. // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * Get rid of a locked cover with MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH. * * The "admin" (root) makes a tmpfs W: * W/D file, holds SECRET, covered by a bind of a file with MASK * W/Dd/inner file, holds SECRET, Dd is covered by a bind of a directory * whose "inner" holds MASK * W/own directory of uid 1000 with the file "mine" and the * directory "minedir", whose "inner" holds MINE * W/dbg debugfs, mode 755. dbg/tracing is an automount point * The "attacker" is uid 1000. It enters a new user namespace with a new mount * namespace, so W and both covers are locked there. * * usage: prog MODE * plain put a bind of own/mine beneath the cover of D, unmount the cover * nsfile put a bind of the mount namespace file of a child beneath the * cover of D, then unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) * nsfile-control the same with a bind of own/mine * shrink put a bind of the automounted tracefs beneath the cover of Dd, * unmount the cover, put a tmpfs beneath W, call umount(W), which fails * shrink-control the same with a bind of own/minedir * The environment variable AUTOMOUNT_DIR names another automount point for "shrink". */ #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <errno.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <grp.h> #include <sched.h> #include <signal.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> ---truncated---

IMPACT: Affected Products and Software

Affected Products

The following products are affected by CVE-2026-99170 vulnerability. Where our threat engine knows the exact affected versions, they are listed below.

IDVENDORPRODUCTACTION
1linuxLinux View
2linuxLinux View
Total affected vendors: 1|Products: 2

RED HAT CSAF/VEX: Product Impact Check

Red Hat has not yet published a CSAF/VEX impact record for this CVE. This does not mean “not affected”.

SCORING: CVSS from Multiple Sources

CVSS Scores

The Common Vulnerability Scoring System is a standardised framework for assessing the severity of vulnerabilities in software and systems. We collect and display CVSS scores from several sources for each CVE.

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The sources have not yet published a verified CVSS metric.

Patch and Remediation Guide

Solution & Remediation Advisory

Patch status unknown

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Confirm the affected product and version against the source evidence above.
Restrict access to internet-facing services and apply network segmentation.
Until a patch is confirmed, follow the vendor advisory; do not read an unknown status as “no patch”.
Monitor server logs and network endpoints for signs of anomalous execution.

Public exploit and active exploitation status

Verified exploit intelligence

No verified public PoC, exploit repository or Metasploit module has been found for this CVE yet.

Weakness Classification and Attack Patterns (CWE & CAPEC)

CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration

While CVE identifies specific instances of vulnerabilities, CWE categorises the common flaws or weaknesses that can lead to vulnerabilities. CVE-2026-99170 is associated with the following CWEs:

Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)

Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the common attributes and approaches employed by adversaries to exploit the CVE-2026-99170 weaknesses.

Official Sources and Advisories

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CVE-2026-99170 · namespace: a mount that copy_tree() leaves…