Contiki-NG MQTT Client Out-of-Bounds Write in PUBLISH Topic Parser via Persistent State Between TCP Segments

Contiki-NG's MQTT client parse_publish_vhdr() in os/net/app-layer/mqtt/mqtt.c sets topic_len_received=1 before checking topic_len against the 64-byte limit, so an over-length topic returns early but leaves the flag set. On the next TCP segment, tcp_input() re-invokes the parser with topic_received==0, and the persisted topic_len_received==1 skips the length-reading block containing the guard, falling through directly to a memcpy() that uses the unvalidated 16-bit topic_len as the copy length. The 65-byte topic[] destination overruns into adjacent struct fields including the payload_chunk pointer, which subsequent MQTT code dereferences, giving a compromised or attacker-controlled broker an arbitrary-pointer-write primitive. Contiki-NG's MQTT implementation has no TLS support so the connection is plaintext. Impact ranges from information disclosure and denial of service to remote code execution on embedded targets without memory protection.