A russh SSH server accepts a publickey authentication whose signature uses a different algorithm than the one named in the request
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5 h ago
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Vulnerability description
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DayBreach AI Explanation
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Short explanation
The russh SSH server fails to compare the requested algorithm name in publickey authentication requests with the signature's own algorithm. This allows authentication to succeed using a signature algorithm different from the one requested.
This vulnerability stems from the server omitting the comparison between the requested algorithm name and the signature. When validation is skipped, unexpected signature algorithms can be accepted, weakening authentication reliability.
What should be done?
- Follow vendor advisories and security updates.
- Upgrade affected russh dependencies to secured versions.
Chain of evidence and sources
russh kütüphanesinde sunucu, istekte talep edilen algoritma adı ile imzanın algoritmasını karşılaştırmamaktadır.
Etkilenen sürümler ilk sürüm olan 0.34.0-beta.1 sürümünden 0.64.0 öncesine kadardır.
Show the technical text from the sources
### Details In `russh/src/server/encrypted.rs`, `server_read_auth_request_pk` (0.63.3, around lines 880-990): * The requested algorithm name (`pubkey_algo`) is read and only used to decode the key: `PublicKeyOrCertificate::decode(&pubkey_algo, &pubkey_key)`. The derived `hash_alg` is then dropped (`PublicKeyOrCertificate::PublicKey { ref key, .. }`). * The signature blob is decoded (`Signature::decode`) and verified with `Verifier::verify(&pubkey, &buf, &sig)`. `ssh-key` picks the hash from **the signature's own algorithm** (`sig.algorithm()`). * `pubkey_algo` and `sig.algorithm()` are never compared. So for an RSA key, the request can say `rsa-sha2-512` while the signature is `ssh-rsa`. The signature is valid for SHA-1, verification succeeds, and `Handler::auth_publickey` is called. **Affected versions: every russh release, from the first (`0.34.0-beta.1`, 2022-03) through 0.63.3 and current `main`.** The behaviour is inherited from `thrussh`, which russh was forked from. The mechanism changed over time, but the outcome is the same: the hash is always taken from the signature blob, never checked against the request. * **Up to 0.46:** after reading the algorithm name inside the signature blob, russh overwrites the key's hash with it (`pubkey.set_algorithm(algo_)`), then verifies. * **From 0.47/0.48 (move to `ssh-key`):** the signature is decoded with its own algorithm (`sig_workaround::Sig::decode`, later `Signature::decode`) and verified with it. Confirmed by running the PoC below on 0.63.3. Confirmed by reading the code of `server/encrypted.rs` in 0.34.0-beta.1, 0.34.0, 0.36.0, 0.36.1, 0.37.1, 0.40.2, 0.43.0, 0.45.0, 0.46.0, 0.48.2, 0.50.4, 0.54.6, 0.58.1, 0.63.1, 0.63.3 and `main` (2026-09-30), and in thrussh 0.33.5. ### PoC A unit test in the existing test module of `russh/src/server/encrypted.rs`. It uses the module's own helpers (`test_auth_session`, `sign_with_hash_alg`, `PrivateKeyWithHashAlg`) and needs no network or configuration. 1. Check out russh 0.63.3, or `main`. 2. Paste the code below inside `mod tests { ... }` of `russh/src/server/encrypted.rs`. 3. Run `cargo test --lib poc_sha1`. ```rust // ---- PoC: signature algorithm not checked against the requested one ---- /// Records whether `auth_publickey` (called only after the signature /// verified) was reached. #[derive(Default)] struct AcceptAnyKey { authenticated: bool, } impl Handler for AcceptAnyKey { type Error = Error; async fn auth_publickey_offered( &mut self, _user: &str, _public_key: &PublicKey, ) -> Result<Auth, Self::Error> { Ok(Auth::Accept) } async fn auth_publickey( &mut self, _user: &str, _public_key: &PublicKey, ) -> Result<Auth, Self::Error> { self.authenticated = true; Ok(Auth::Accept) } } /// A signed publickey request that names `announced` as its public key /// algorithm, but is signed with `hash` (`None` = `ssh-rsa`, SHA-1). fn signed_request_announcing( user: &str, private_key: Arc<PrivateKey>, announced: &str, hash: Option<crate::keys::HashAlg>, ) -> Vec<u8> { let mut packet = Vec::new(); packet.push(msg::USERAUTH_REQUEST); user.encode(&mut packet).unwrap(); "ssh-connection".encode(&mut packet).unwrap(); "publickey".encode(&mut packet).unwrap(); 1u8.encode(&mut packet).unwrap(); announced.encode(&mut packet).unwrap(); private_key.public_key().to_bytes().unwrap().encode(&mut packet).unwrap(); let mut signed = Vec::new(); CryptoVec::new().as_ref().encode(&mut signed).unwrap(); signed.extend_from_slice(&packet); let signature = sign_with_hash_alg(&PrivateKeyWithHashAlg::new(private_key, hash), &signed).unwrap(); signature.encode(&mut packet).unwrap(); packet } #[tokio::test] async fn poc_sha1_signature_accepted_when_rsa_sha2_512_is_announced() { let rsa = ssh_key::private::RsaKeypair::random(&mut rand::rng(), 2048).unwrap(); let private = Arc::new(PrivateKey::from(rsa)); let mut session = test_auth_session(); let mut handler = AcceptAnyKey::default(); // The request says rsa-sha2-512; the signature blob is ssh-rsa (SHA-1). let packet = signed_request_announcing("alice", private, "rsa-sha2-512", None); session.process_packet(&mut handler, &packet).await.unwrap(); // RFC 8332 §3: the signature algorithm must be the requested one, so // this request must be rejected. On russh 0.63.3 it is accepted. assert!( !handler.authenticated, "an ssh-rsa (SHA-1) signature was accepted for a request announcing rsa-sha2-512" ); } ``` Result on unmodified 0.63.3: ``` test server::encrypted::tests::poc_sha1_signature_accepted_when_rsa_sha2_512_is_announced ... FAILED panicked at src/server/encrypted.rs: an ssh-rsa (SHA-1) signature was accepted for a request announcing rsa-sha2-512 ``` With the fix below, the test passes and the whole library suite still passes: `cargo test --lib` gives 186 passed. Suggested fix: reject a mismatch through the existing `reject_auth_request(until, ...)` path, so the constant rejection time is kept. ```diff --- a/russh/src/server/encrypted.rs +++ b/russh/src/server/encrypted.rs @@ -1023,6 +1023,21 @@ map_err!(ensure_end(&signature_reader))?; map_err!(ensure_end(r))?; + // RFC 8332 §3: the signature must use the algorithm the + // request names. + let offered_algorithm = match pk_or_cert { + PublicKeyOrCertificate::PublicKey { .. } => ssh_key::Algorithm::new(&pubkey_algo), + PublicKeyOrCertificate::Certificate(_) => { + <ssh_key::Algorithm as crate::helpers::AlgorithmExt>::new_certificate_ext(&pubkey_algo) + } + }; + if offered_algorithm.ok().as_ref() != Some(&sig.algorithm()) { + debug!("signature algorithm does not match the requested one"); + auth_user.clear(); + reject_auth_request(until, &mut self.write, auth_request).await?; + return Ok(()); + } + let is_valid = if accepted_probe_matches && user == auth_user { true } else { ``` ### Impact This is a missing check on the signature algorithm (improper verification of a cryptographic signature's algorithm, CWE-347) in the server's `publickey` authentication. Who is impacted: applications that use russh as an **SSH server** and rely on the requested algorithm to restrict, record or audit user-key signature algorithms. For example: * a server that refuses SHA-1 (`ssh-rsa`) signatures, as OpenSSH does by default since 8.8; * a server that logs which algorithm a client authenticated with. Such a server can be made to accept a SHA-1 signature, or to record `rsa-sha2-512` for one, by any holder of a valid RSA key. Not impacted: * russh clients; * authentication strength beyond the choice of hash, since a valid signature by the private key is still required; * Te RSA keys were examined, the case where one key admits several signature algorithms (`ssh-rsa`, `rsa-sha2-256`, `rsa-sha2-512`). We did not test other key types.
CWE: CWE-347
Explanation produced with the local gemini-flash-lite-latest model. Numerical metrics and the KEV, patch and exploit statuses are not determined by AI.
IMPACT: Affected Products and Software
Affected Products
The following products are affected by CVE-2026-111062 vulnerability. Where our threat engine knows the exact affected versions, they are listed below.
| ID | VENDOR | PRODUCT | ACTION |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | crates.io | russh | View |
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SCORING: CVSS from Multiple Sources
CVSS Scores
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System is a standardised framework for assessing the severity of vulnerabilities in software and systems. We collect and display CVSS scores from several sources for each CVE.
| SCORE | VERSION | SEVERITY | VECTOR | SOURCE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2.3 | CVSS 4.0 | — | Vector not published | GitHub Advisory |
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Public exploit and active exploitation status
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No verified public PoC, exploit repository or Metasploit module has been found for this CVE yet.
Weakness Classification and Attack Patterns (CWE & CAPEC)
CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration
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Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
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Official Sources and Advisories
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